We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has more information on the game than his opponent. We show how to construct numerical schemes for the value function of this game, which is given by the solution of a quasilinear partial differential equation with obstacle.
Introduction
In 1967 Aumann and Maschler presented their celebrated model for games with incomplete information, see [1] and references therein. The game they consider consists in a set of, say I, standard discrete time two person zero-sum games. At the beginning one of these zero-sum games is picked at random according to a probability p. The information which game was picked is transmitted to Player 1 only, while Player 2 just knows p. It is assumed that both players observe the actions of the other one, so Player 2 might infer from the actions of his opponent which game is actually played. It turns out that it is optimal for the informed player to play with an additional randomness. Namely in a such a way, that he optimally manipulates the beliefs of the uninformed player. The extension to two-player zero-sum stochastic differential games has recently been given by Cardaliaguet and Rainer in [10] , [8] , where the value function is characterized by the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs (HJI) equation with an obstacle in the form of a convexity constraint in p. The HJI equation without obstacle is the one which is also found to characterize stochastic differential games in the classical work of Fleming and Souganidis [15] . The probability p appears as an additional parameter in which the value function has to be convex. In Cardaliaguet [9] an approximation scheme for the value function of deterministic differential games with incomplete information is introduced. An extension of [9] to deterministic games with information incompleteness on both sides is given in the work of Souquiere [22] . We consider the case where the underlying dynamic is given by a diffusion with controlled drift but uncontrolled non-degenerate volatility. In constrast to [9] and [22] we can work on the problem under a Girsanov transform. This transform is a well known tool to consider stochastic games with complete information in the context of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) (see Hamadène and Lepeltier [18] ). An approximation of the value function of a stochastic differential game via BSDEs has been discussed in Bally [2] . Different to [2] our algorithm is closely related to the work of Barles and Souganidis [4] who consider monotone approximation schemes for fully nonlinear second order partial differential equations. The latter was also applied in the recent work of Fahim, Touzi and Warin [12] where fully nonlinear parabolic PDEs are treated. As in [12] we use a kind of finite difference scheme for the HIJ backwards in time and combine it with taking the convex hull in p at each time step to capture the effect of the information incompleteness. Note that this rather direct ansatz using a probabilistic PDE scheme also significantly differs from the Makov chain approximation method for stochastic differential games described in Kushner [21] . From the very beginning of the investigation of BSDEs initiated by Peng in [23] the close relationship with optimal control problems and quasilinear PDEs has been exploited. Consequently, also the approximation of solutions to BSDEs and to quasilinear PDEs are closely related. For a survey on BSDEs we refer to El Karoui, Peng and Quenez [13] , while a survey on the numerical approximation of BSDEs can be found in Bouchard, Elie and Touzi [5] . In this sense our result can also be interpreted as approximation of the solutions to the BSDEs which appear in the BSDE representation of the value function for stochastic differential games with incomplete information in [17] . The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the game and restate the results of [10] and [8] which build the basis for our investigation. In section 3 we present the approximation scheme and give some regularity proofs. Section 4 is devoted to the convergence proof.
Setup

Formal description of the game
Let C([t 0 , T ]; R d ) be the set of continuous functions from R to R d , which are constant on (−∞, t 0 ] and on [T, +∞). We denote by B s (ω B ) = ω B (s) the coordinate mapping on C([t 0 , T ]; R d ) and define H = (H s ) as the filtration generated by s → B s . We denote Ω t = {ω ∈ C([t, T ]; R d )} and H t,s the σ-algebra generated by paths up to time s in Ω t . Furthermore we provide C([t 0 , T ]; R d ) with the Wiener measure P 0 on (H s ). In the following we investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game starting at a time t ≥ t 0 with terminal time T . For any fixed initial data t ∈ [t 0 , T ], x ∈ R d the two players control a diffusion on
where we assume that the controls of the players u, v can only take their values in some compact subsets of some finite dimensional spaces, denoted by U , V respectively. The aim of the game is to optimize
which are chosen according to a probability p ∈ ∆(I) before the game starts. At the beginning of the game this information is transmitted only to Player 1. We assume that Player 1 chooses his control to minimize, Player 2 chooses his control to maximize the expected payoff. Furthermore we assume both players observe their opponents control. So Player 2, knowing only the probability p i for scenario i ∈ {1, . . . , I} at the beginning, will try to guess the missing information from the behavior of his opponent. The following will be the standing assumption throughout the paper. Assumption (A)
is bounded and continuous in all its variables and Lipschitz continuous with respect to (t, x) uniformly in (u, v).
is non-singular and (σ * ) −1 (t, x) is bounded and Lipschitz continuous with respect to (t, x). 
By assumption (A) the Hamiltonian H is Lipschitz continuous in (ξ, p) uniformly in (t, x) and Lipschitz continuous in (t, x) with Lipschitz constant c(1 + |ξ|), i.e. it holds for all t, t
and
Strategies and value function
We now give the necessary definitions and the results of [8] and [10] on which we will base our investigation. 
The set of strategies for Player 1 is denoted by A(t). The definition of strategies β :
Player 2 is similar. The set of strategies for Player 2 is denoted by B(t).
With Definition 2.2. it is possible to prove via a fixed point argument the following Lemma, which is a slight modification of Lemma 5.1. in [10] . Lemma 2.3. To each pair of strategies (α, β) ∈ A(t) × B(t) one can associate a unique couple of admissible controls
A characteristic feature of games with incomplete or asymmetric information is that the players have to find a balance between acting optimally according to their information and hiding it. To this end it turns out that he will give his behavior a certain additional randomness. This effect is captured in the following definition.
Definition 2.4. A random strategy for Player 1 at time
is a probability space in I and α :
where Ω α is equipped with the σ-field G α ,
(ii) there exists δ > 0 such that for all s ∈ [t, T ] and for any f, f
The set of random strategies for Player 1 is denoted by A r (t). The definition of random strategies ((Ω β , G β , P β ), β), where β :
Player 2 is similar. The set of random strategies for Player 2 is denoted by B r (t).
Remark 2.5. Again one can associate to each couple of random strategies (α,
where as in Remark 2.5. we associate toᾱ i , β for any
The process X t,x,ᾱi,β is then defined for any (ωᾱ i , ω β ) as solution to the SDE (1) with the associated controls. Furthermore Eᾱ i,β is the expectation on Ωᾱ i × Ω β × C([t, T ]; R d ) with respect to the probability Pᾱ i ⊗ P β ⊗ P 0 , where
Under assumption (A) the existence of the value of the game and its characterization as a viscosity solution to an obstacle problem is shown in [8] , [10] .
the value of the game with incomplete information V (t, x, p) is given by
with terminal condition w(T, x, p)
and T ∆(I)(p) denotes the tangent cone to
Remark 2.7. Unlike the standard definition of viscosity solutions (see e.g. [11] ) the subsolution property to (7) is required only on the interior of ∆(I) while the supersolution property to (7) is required on the whole domain ∆(I) (see [8] and [10] ). This is due to the fact that we actually consider viscosity solutions with a state constraint, namely p ∈ ∆(I) R I . For more details we refer to [7] .
3 Approximation of the value function
Numerical scheme
Our approximation scheme of the value function basically amounts to approximate the solution of the obstacle problem (7) . In order to do so it is convenient to consider the real dynamics of the game (1) under a Girsanov transform. This technique -first applied to stochastic differential games by [18] enables us to decouple the forward dynamics (1) from the controls of the players. As in [2] where this transformation is applied in the context of numerical approximation for stochastic differential games via BSDE we will use the following approximation for the forward dynamics .
Furthermore we define the discrete process (X k,x n ) n=k,...,L as the standard Euler scheme approximation for (9) 
where ∆B j = B tj+1 − B tj . We will approximate the value function (6) backwards in time. To do so we set for all
and we define recursively for
and Vex p denotes the convex hull, i.e. the largest function that is convex in the variable p and does not exceed the given function.
Some regularity properties
Monotonicity
First we show that our scheme fulfills a monotonicity condition which corresponds to the one in [4] (2.2). It is well known that this criteria is crucial for the convergence of general finite difference schemes. 
For φ ∈ C 1 the result follows from partial integration with θ = 1 0 
where O(τ ) is independent of p. 
Since 0 ≤ φ(x) − ψ(x) ≤ c for any x ∈ R, we have
with C := M σ −1 ∞ independent of (t k , x, p) and τ . Furthermore we can explicitely calculate
where Γ denotes the gamma function.
Lipschitz continuity in x
To show that the Lipschitz continuity in x is preserved under the scheme, we establish the following Lemma. 
where C M,τ = M (1 + cτ ) + cτ with c independent of p.
Proof: We fix k ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}, x, x ′ ∈ R, p ∈ ∆(I) and write
Assume that φ ∈ C 1 with |D x φ| ≤ M . First we consider the last term of (14) . We have for
Since by (4) the Hamiltonian H is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x with Lipschitz constant c(1+|ξ|) it holds
For the remaining terms in (14) we note that by (4) the Hamiltonian H is uniformly Lipschitz continuous. So there exists as in Lemma 3.
For the first term of (15) we have with
We finally use Cauchy-Schwartz (note that in the expansion of the square the ∆B k parts vanish when taking expectation), |Θ 2 | ≤ M and the Lipschitz contiunity of σ to get
For the second term of (15) we use the uniform Lipschitz continuity of (σ * ) −1 (by assumption (A)) to have with the
The case of Lipschitz continuous φ follows by approximation with a sequence of C 1 functions (φ ǫ ) ǫ>0 which converges uniformly to φ. Since φ is uniformly Lipschitz continuous with constant M , we may assume that |D x φ ǫ | ≤ M for all ǫ > 0.
With the previous Lemma it is easy to show the Lipschitz continuity of
p) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x with a Lipschitz constant that depends only on the constants of assumption (A).
Proof: We will show Proposition 3.5. by induction. With (A) we have that V τ (t L , x, p) is Lipschitz continuous in x with a constant M L that depends only on the constants of assumption (A). Let M k be the Lipschitz constant for V τ (t k , ·, p) then by (12) and Lemma 3.3. and since Vex is monotonic, we have
for a C independent of τ, x, p is a constant dominating the recursively defined Lipschitz constants
With the uniform Lipschitz continuity of V τ in x it follows that the value function is uniformly bounded.
is uniformly bounded by a constant only depending on the constants of assumption (A).
. Assume first that V τ is at t k+1 continuously differentiable in the second variable with |D x V τ | ≤ M . Then with Θ :
Since V τ is by Lemma 3.3. uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x one has (16) in the general case again by regularization. By (A) V τ (t L , x, p) is bounded by a constant M L that depends only on the constants of assumption (A). Let M k be a bound for |V τ (t k , ·, p)| then by (3) the definition (12) and (16) we have
and M L + cT (1 + M ) is a constant dominating the recursively defined constants (M k ) k=0,...,L .
Lipschitz continuity in p
The Lipschitz continuity of V τ (t · , x, p) in p can be shown with similar methods. 
First note that by (4) the Hamiltonian is uniformly Lipschitz in p. Hence
By (4) the Hamiltonian H is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in ξ with a constant c. So by Lemma 3.1.
Assume for now that φ is differentiable in p with |D p φ| ≤ M . Then with Θ :
where for the first estimate in the last line we used again Cauchy Schwartz as in the previous Lemma. The general case follows again by regularization.
It is now easy to show the Lipschitz continuity of V τ (t · , x, p) in p as in Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.7. V τ (t · , x, p) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in p with a Lipschitz constant only depending on the constants of assumption (A).
Hölder continuity in t
Finally we use the Lipschitz continuity of V τ in x to establish the Hölder continuity in time.
is Hölder continuous in t . , in the sense that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , L − 1}, l ∈ {1, . . . L − k}, there exists a constant c only depending on the constants of assumption (A), such that
Proof: We fix (x, p) ∈ R d × ∆(I). By (12) , (3) and the convexity of V τ in p we have
where we used that by (16) |z k (x, p)| is bounded uniformly in p ∈ ∆(I) by the Lipschitz constant of
Note that by definition (12)
.
Hence by (A) and the fact that V τ is convex in p we have
Since lτ = |t k+l − t k | repeating this now l − 2 times gives
Furthermore by the Lipschitz continutity of V τ in x and (A) it holds
Convergence
Theorem 4.1. Under (A) we have uniform convergence on the compact subsets of
Note that by Proposition 3.5. the family (V τ , τ > 0) is uniformly bounded. Furthermore by Proposition 3.4., 3.7. and 3.8. the family (V τ , τ > 0) is equicontinuous, hence by Arzela Ascoli compact for the topology of uniform convergence. Furthermore any candidate for the limit of V τ as τ ↓ 0 is as a limit of convex functions convex in p.
→ R be a candidate for the limit. We will show that w is a viscosity solution to (7) . Since this property uniquely characterizes the value function V the convergence follows immediately.
One step a posteriori martingales and DPP
By construction there exists at each time step t k for any x ∈ R d and p ∈ ∆(I) a linear combination of π k,1 (x, p), . . . , π k,I (x, p) ∈ ∆(I) such that
where we can choose (x, p) → λ k (x, p) ∈ ∆(I) and (x, p) → π k (x, p) ∈ ∆(I) I Borel measurable.
Definition 4.2. For all i ∈ I, k = 0, . . . , L, x ∈ R n and p ∈ ∆(I) we define the one step feedbacks p i,x,p k+1 as ∆(I)-valued random variables which are independent of σ(B s ) s∈R , such that
. . , π k,I (x, p)} with probability
Furthermore we define one step a posteriori martingales p The following one step dynamic programming is a direct consequence of Definition 4.2.
Proof: Assume (p) i > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , I. By the construction for all suitable functions f :
and the Lemma follows with (19).
Viscosity solution property
4.2.1 Viscosity subsolution property of w Proposition 4.4. w is a viscosity subsolution of (7) 
Proof: Let φ : [0, T ] × R × ∆(I) → R be a test function such that w − φ has a strict global maximum at (t,x,p), wherep ∈ Int(∆(I)). We have to show, that
holds at (t,x,p). As a limit of convex functions w is convex in p and we have sincep ∈ Int(∆(I))
So it remains to show
Note that by standard arguments (e.g. [3] ) there exists a sequence (
Hence for all x ∈ R, p ∈ ∆(I)
By the definition of V τ (12) it holds
Hence by the monotonicity Lemma 3.2. we have for all τ > 0
By expansion of the smooth function φ τ we have since φ τ is equal to φ with the linear shift ∆ τ the inequality (24).
Viscosity supersolution property of w
Proposition 4.5. w is a viscosity supersolution of (7) In this paper we gave an approximation scheme for the value function of a stochastic differential game with incomplete information. It is natural to ask whether this approximation might be used to determine optimal feedback strategies for the informed player. In the deterministic games with complete information it is well known that the answer is positive (see the step by step motions associated with feedbacks in [20] ). The case of deterministic games with incomplete information has been treated in [9] . The approximation of optimal strategies for stochastic differential games is a more delicate topic even in the case with complete information. [2] -also considering the game under a Girsanov transform -gives a partwise answer under a weak Lipschitz assumption of the feedback control. The result is shown by using approximations of BSDEs however not in a completely discrete framework. In the very recent paper [16] approximately Markov strategies are constructed with an approximation that in contrast to ours takes into account the actions of the other player during the time intervals. This however makes the approximation much harder to implement.
In fact, if we use the approximation for the construction of optimal strategies for the informed player we are in the same situation as [21] . For the approximation of the value function in [21] nearly optimal policies are constructed which possess a certain optimality in the approximative discrete time games instead of the continuous time one. To the authors knowledge the problem of finding an efficient approximation of optimal strategies in stochastic differential games (with or without incomplete information) is open and poses an interesting problem for further research.
